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In the past few years, a new breed of tax-advantaged savings vehicle has emerged.  The federal 
Coverdell Education Savings Account (ESA) allows annual, after-tax deposits of up to $2,000 a year, 
with asset earnings untaxed so long as withdrawals are used for educational expenses. At the state level, 
every state but Washington offers a tax-advantaged 529 savings plan. These accounts allow participants 
to make annual, after-tax deposits of up to $11,000 a year per child, comparable to the annual ceilings on 
the 401(k).
1 The tax treatment is like that of the ESA: earnings are untaxed by the federal government, 
and by almost every state, when the funds are used for postsecondary education. In about half the states, 
deposits are exempt from state taxation, further increasing the income tax advantages of the 529. 
This paper calculates the incentives created by these new savings vehicles and how they vary by 
income. I find that the advantages of the 529 and ESA rise sharply with income, for three reasons. First, 
those with the highest marginal tax rates benefit the most from sheltering income, gaining most in both 
absolute and relative terms. Second, the accounts are risky for families for whom the college attendance 
of children is uncertain, since account holders are penalized if the accounts are not used for schooling. 
The current penalty structure leaves most benefits intact for the upper brackets. Relative to their other 
investment options, those in the top two tax brackets gain more from non-qualified use of a 529 or 
Coverdell than those in the bottom bracket gain from qualified use.  Third, Finally, the college financial 
aid system reduces aid for those families that have any financial assets, including an ESA or 529. Since 
the highest-income families are unaffected by this aid tax, this further intensifies the positive correlation 
between income and the advantages of the tax-advantaged college savings accounts.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I provide some background on the tax-
advantaged college savings plans, as well as evidence from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances on the 
characteristics of those who invest in these accounts. In the third section, I calculate returns on various 
                                                      
1 This is the largest amount that can be deposited in a 529 without triggering a gift tax. I further discuss 
529 contribution limits below.  Since the 401(k) contribution ceilings are for pre-tax income, and the 529 
limits for post-tax income, in effect larger contributions are allowed to the 529 than the 401(k).   2
savings vehicles net of income taxes for a typical household. In the fourth, I examine how the benefit of 
the education savings accounts varies by income, exploring in turn the impact of marginal tax rates, 
penalties for non-educational use of the accounts, and the financial aid tax. The fifth section discusses and 
concludes. 
 
TAX INCENTIVES FOR COLLEGE SAVING: BACKGROUND 
 History of the Coverdell Education Savings Accounts 
In 1997, the Education IRA was established and in 2001 renamed the Coverdell Education 
Savings Account (ESA). The ESA is structured much like the Roth IRA. In both types of vehicles, after-
tax dollars grow tax-free.  Earnings are never taxed if ESA withdrawals are used for postsecondary 
expenses or if Roth funds are withdrawn after age 59 ½. Annual contributions to the ESA were capped at 
$500 per child until 2001, when the contribution limit was raised to $2,000 and educational expenses 
were expanded to include primary and secondary education.  
 
History of the 529 Savings Plans 
While the ESA is a product of  federal legislation, the 529 savings plans are an innovation of the 
states. The 529 savings plans have their roots in prepaid tuition plans, the first of which was introduced 
by Michigan in 1986. Those who purchased shares in Michigan’s plan were guaranteed that their 
investment would cover the cost of a certain number of semesters at Michigan schools. Essentially, 
Michigan created a savings plan whose rate of return was linked to tuition costs at the state’s public 
postsecondary schools, thereby allowing parents to insure against the risk of rising tuition prices.
2 
Michigan exempted investment returns in its prepaid plan from state taxes, and argued to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) that returns should also be exempted from federal taxes. The IRS disagreed, but 
Michigan went forward with the plan and sued the IRS for a refund of taxes paid, winning its case in 
                                                      
2 A key drawback of the prepaid plans is that the tuition guarantee is only for in-state schools.  Funds can 
be used at out-of-state schools, but the implied rate of return on funds used in this way is quite low.   3
1994. While the Michigan case was wending through the courts, several other states introduced their own 
prepaid tuition plans. 
In 1997, Congress codified the federal tax treatment of the tuition plans in Internal Revenue Code 
Section 529. IRC 529 also contains language that recognized a variant on the prepaid plans that had been 
introduced by a handful of states: the tax-advantaged college savings plan. Like the ESA, these new 
savings plans allowed after-tax investments to grow free of federal and state taxes; however, withdrawals 
used for postsecondary costs were exempt only from state taxation. With the passage of tax reform in 
2001, the federal tax on withdrawals from 529 savings plans was eliminated.
3 States that did not already 
have a savings plan quickly established one. As of summer 2003, every state except Washington had a 
529 savings plan, as does the District of Columbia. The growth of the 529 savings plans has far 
outstripped that of the prepaid plans, likely because of their greater fungibility and potentially higher 
returns.  In this paper, I focus on the 529 savings plans. 
 
Eligibility for and Tax Advantages of the 529 and ESA 
The tax treatments of the ESA and 529 are quite similar: after-tax dollars put into savings and 
earnings are not taxed as they accrue, or at withdrawal, if the withdrawal is used for educational expenses. 
However, there are some key differences between the two savings vehicles.  
First, there is an income limit on participation in the ESA. Joint-filer households with adjusted 
gross income (AGI) above $220,000, and single-filer households with AGI above $110,000, cannot 
contribute to an ESA; eligibility begins to phase out at $190,000 and $95,000, respectively. There is no 
income limit on contributions to a 529 savings plan.
4 
                                                      
3 This federal tax treatment of the 529 savings plans sunsets in 2010. The present analysis assumes that 
the provision will be extended indefinitely. 
4 No state has an income cap on eligibility for the exclusion of 529 earnings from taxation. Only Georgia 
has an income cap on eligibility for the deduction of contributions from state taxable income; the income 
cap is $100,000 for joint-filer households.   4
A second distinguishing characteristic of the 529 is that its contribution limits are much higher 
than that on the ESA. The annual contribution limit to an ESA is $2,000 per child. By contrast, each 
parent can make an annual deposit of $11,000 per child into a 529 without triggering a gift tax. A two-
parent family with three children can therefore move $66,000 per year into a tax-advantaged 529 account. 
Grandparents, or any relative, can also make deposits up to these limits, further expanding the assets that 
can be shielded from taxation. Further, any contributor can elect to make five years’ worth of 
contributions in a single year, as long as none are made over the next four years, thereby allowing each 
person a contribution of up to $55,000 in a single year. Each state has a lifetime limit, periodically 
adjusted, on contributions that can be made to its 529 plan in the name of a beneficiary. This limit 
currently averages $241,000 and ranges from $182,000 in Louisiana to $305,000 in South Dakota.
5  
Third, while families can invest their ESAs as they wish, they are constrained in their ability to 
allocate assets in a 529. Each state determines the investment options open to investors in its plan and, by 
federal law, assets can be reallocated by the investor only once a year. Until recently, most 529 savings 
plans provided only a single investment option, an age-based portfolio that grew less aggressive as the 
child neared college age.  Most plans now offer several investment options. 
Fourth, the degree to which the account owner can control the use of funds differs between the 
529 and ESA. A 529 account owner – generally a parent, but perhaps a grandparent or other relative – 
retains control of the account. At any time, the 529 owner can withdraw the funds, though if they are not 
used for college expenses she will have to pay a penalty and ordinary income taxes on the earnings 
portion of the withdrawal. A person that establishes an ESA for a child, by contrast, cannot withdraw the 
funds, since the ESA is technically owned by the beneficiary. While the adult can change the ESA 
beneficiary at any time, he or she cannot simply close the account and take back the funds. Should the 
beneficiary reach age 30 with funds still in the ESA, the funds are distributed to the beneficiary, with 
ordinary income taxes (at the beneficiary’s rate) and a 10 percent penalty assessed on the earnings. 
                                                      
5 Cerulli Associates (2003).    5
Finally, the 529s are creatures of state government, with each state sponsoring its own plan. 
Individuals are free to participate in any state’s plan. Many of the states encourage their residents to invest 
in the local plan by allowing them to deduct contributions to its 529 savings plan from state taxable 
income. Each state contracts with a mutual fund company to run its plan, chooses the mutual funds that 
will be available to investors, decides upon the treatment of deposits and earnings for the purposes of state 
taxation, and negotiates fees that will be paid by the investor to the state and fund company. There is, 
therefore, heterogeneity across the states in 529 characteristics, particularly in portfolio choice and net 
returns.  Variation in net returns is driven not only by the fact that some states allow the deduction of 
contributions from taxable income, but by differences in state marginal tax rates and the fees charged by 
the states for 529 accounts. In ongoing work, I examine these sources of cross-state variation in 529 
returns and their impact on savings decisions.  
Of note, I have found that much of the cross-state variation in net returns on 529s is driven by 
fees, which not only vary considerably across the states but appear higher, on average, than those on retail 
mutual funds, IRAs or ESAs. In order to focus on variation in returns to the 529 and ESA across income 
groups, I assume here that pretax returns on the various savings vehicles are identical. However, for those 
cases in which I find only a small advantage to the 529, it should be kept in mind that this advantage 
could be erased by higher fees. Because, as we shall see, the tax advantages of the savings account rise 
with income, the fees necessary to eliminate these tax advantages also rise with income.  
Here, I give a rough sense of the differential in fees necessary to erase the tax advantages of the 
529. Consider a family with an income of $50,000 trying to decide between putting funds in a 529 or a 
standard, non-tax-advantaged mutual fund. Assume both savings vehicles have the same gross returns, the 
family’s home state does not allow the deduction of 529 contributions from state taxable income, and that 
the state’s income tax rates are at the national median.  
Under this scenario, the 529 will be a worse deal if its fees produce an annualized return that is 70 
basis points below the return on the non-advantaged account. For a family with $335,000 in income, the 
relevant difference in annualized returns is 145 basis points. If a state offers a deduction for 529   6
contributions, the advantages of the 529 rise and a larger fee difference is needed to make the 529 a worse 
deal than a non-advantaged account: 180 basis points for the high-income household and 100 points for 
the middle-income household.
6 
These are large fee differentials, but they are not beyond the range of fees observed in some state 
529 plans. In particular, 529s sold through financial advisors generally charge loads, which could easily 
produce asset losses comparable to those just discussed. In every state 529, however, there is an option to 
purchase without an advisor, thereby avoiding these sales charges. Less easily avoided are high, annual 
asset-based fees in some plans. Wyoming’s plan charges annual fees of 1.8 to 2.4 percent of assets. Since 
retail mutual funds are available that charge asset-based fees below 0.5 percent (e.g., Vanguard’s index 
funds), this is a case in which high fees in a 529 more than erase its tax advantages. Many Wyoming 
residents would yield higher returns in a non-advantaged account with lower fees.
 7 
 
 Profile of the 529 and ESA Investor  
In this section, I present evidence on the type of household that invests in the education savings 
accounts. Since the 529 has become broadly available only in recent years, data on 529 investors are 
scarce. The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances is the first representative survey to gather information on 
529 savings plans. However, the 2001 SCF predates the recent expansion of the tax advantages of the 529 
and ESA and resulting surge in account volume. At the start of 2001, about twenty states did not even 
have a 529 savings plan in place, while today every state but Washington has established one.  
As a result, much of the growth in 529 savings plan accounts occurred after the 2001 SCF was 
administered. From the end of 2000 to the end of 2002, the number of 529 savings plan accounts grew 
from half a million to 3.1 million. Over the same period, assets held in these accounts grew from $3.1 
                                                      
6 Note that if fees are any higher in a 529 (without a deduction) than they are in a Traditional IRA, the 
529 will be a worse deal. This is because, as we shall see, these two vehicles have exactly the same tax 
advantages, so even small differences in fees will tip the scale toward the IRA. 
7 Wyoming has no income tax, so the tax benefits of the 529 are lower than those in the typical state, 
making this plan an even worse deal.   7
billion to $20 billion.
8  The SCF therefore understates the current incidence of investment in 529s and 
ESAs. Further, the portrait of the typical savings plan investor that emerges from the SCF may not 
accurately reflect the profile of today’s typical investor, since the early adopters may differ systematically 
from later investors.  
Summary statistics for the SCF sample are shown in Table 1.
9  Column (1) shows the statistics for 
all households with children 16 and under, while Column (2) shows statistics for only those households 
that hold a 529 or ESA. As of 2001, three percent of households with children report holding an ESA or 
529.
10 Education savers are 41 years old, on average, and their oldest child is nine. They have two 
children and are well-educated, with over 90 percent having at least 16 years of education. Their median 
income is $91,000 and their median net worth $281,000. Among education savers, the mean balance in 
529 accounts is $15,000 and in IRA or Keogh accounts is $21,000.
11   
Column (4) shows the difference in characteristics between the college savers and the rest of the 
population with children; the standard errors of these differences are also shown. The education savers are 
older, and have younger children. Most notably, their median household income is $41,000 above the 
sample median of $50,000. They are also better-educated; just 37 percent of all households with children 
have a BA or more, as compared to 91 percent of the education savers.  
It is not surprising to find that education savers have higher incomes and education than the rest 
of the population, as in any dataset these characteristics strongly predict a higher incidence and level of 
saving.  A more interesting question is whether those who invest in the 529 and ESA differ from those 
                                                      
8 Cerulli Associates (2003). 
9 The SCF provides multiple imputations, each of which produced statistically identical versions of Table 
1. I use imputation two, and also use the sample weights provided. 
10 The SCF is a relatively small survey. Once the sample is limited to households with children under 
sixteen, there are just fifteen hundred observations. The three percent holding an ESA or 529 translates 
into fewer than 50 households. These small numbers preclude any fine cuts of the data. 
11 A single question was asked about balances in all forms of IRAs, including Roth IRAs, Traditional 
IRAs and Education IRAs, the former name for ESAs. As a result, it is not possible to separately calculate 
holdings in ESAs.    8
who save in other tax-advantaged vehicles.  If the income and education of education savers are lower 
than those of other savers, this would suggest that the education savings accounts may be attracting those 
who might not otherwise save at all.  
A particularly illuminating comparison is between education savers and those savers who make 
use of the Roth IRA, Traditional IRA and Keogh. These accounts closely resemble the 529 and ESA: 
their tax advantages are similar and none of these accounts are employer-provided. This is important 
because employer-provided accounts, such as the 401(k), ease the saving process: employers 
automatically set up accounts for employees, choose a mutual fund provider, select a menu of mutual 
funds, provide payroll deduction, and may match employee contributions. By contrast, investing in the 
education savings accounts, like investing in the Keogh and IRAs, requires considerable effort and 
initiative. An investor in a 529 or ESA must actively decide to open an account, research the available 
options, choose a financial provider, and arrange for deposits.  
Column (3) shows the characteristics of the retirement savers, the 38 percent of households with 
children who invest in an IRA or Keogh. The retirement savers have a median income somewhat lower 
than that of the education savers – $75,000 vs. $91,000. The median net worth of the retirement savers is 
also lower – $228,000 vs. $281,000. Column (5) shows these differences between the education savers 
and the retirement savers. Education savers have incomes, education and wealth that are higher than those 
of both the retirement savers and the general population. 
The picture that emerges, then, at least as of 2001, is that those who take up 529 and Coverdell 
accounts are a relatively elite group. Their characteristics suggest that they are not new savers, but those 
who already have substantial savings in other vehicles.
12 This may be true, in part, because of the relative 
youth of the programs. Those who seek out information about these new instruments – the early adapters 
– may differ systematically from those who join in when the programs are more well-established. College 
                                                      
12 What we cannot learn from this table is whether the 529/ESA accounts are new dollars saved or dollars 
shifted from other vehicles. In ongoing work, I attempt to answer this question by making use of cross-
state variation in net returns to and timing of the introduction of the 529 savings plans.    9
savers may become more similar to the typical household with children, and to other savers, as the 
programs widen in popularity. 
 
CALCULATION OF AFTER-TAX RETURNS ON COVERDELL, 529 AND ALTERNATIVE 
SAVINGS VEHICLES 
In this section, I calculate returns, net of the income tax, on the 529 and ESA, in absolute terms 
and relative to other vehicles. I first show variation in net returns across vehicles for a single household 
type, with household income of $100,000 and two dependent children. Since the benefits of tax-




For the purposes of assigning tax rates, I consider a household that consists of a married couple, 
with two dependent children, filing jointly, with no itemized deductions. All earned parental income is 
assumed to come from one earner.
13 I assume that the children have enough earned or unearned income to 
require that they pay taxes on returns to assets held in their name.
14 The marginal federal and state tax 
rates on earned income, capital gains, dividends and interest for this household, as well as for the other 
income groups I will be analyzing, are shown in Table 2. The state tax rates in Table 2 are the average of 
                                                      
13 Some assumption about the distribution of earned income within the household must be made in order 
to assign FICA rates. For each earner, the FICA rate is 7.65 percent up to $87,000 and 1.45 percent 
thereafter. 
14 The tax rate on a child’s unearned income depends on her income and age. For children with low 
enough income, the tax rate is zero. For children under 14, income between $750 and $1,500 is taxed at 
the child’s marginal rate and income above $1,500 is taxed at the parent’s marginal rate. For children over 
14, all income above $750 is taxed at the child’s marginal rate. For the purposes of the paper, I assume 
that the child’s income is such that her unearned income is taxed at the child’s marginal rate and that the 
child’s tax rate is that of the lowest bracket. See US Department of the Treasury (2003) for rules on the 
taxation of dependent children.   10
the states’ 2002 marginal tax rates for each income group, as calculated by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s TAXSIM program.
15   
Table 2 shows, and the paper’s calculations use, federal tax rates effective as of the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. Some of these rates are scheduled to revert to 
pre-2003 rates in a few years. Since it is difficult to forecast which, if any, of these provisions will be 
allowed to sunset, in this paper I calculate the effect of making the current tax rates permanent. 
For each savings vehicle, I calculate the return to $1,000 of pretax income placed in an account at 
the time of a child’s birth. A family saving for college will likely start with a portfolio heavily weighted 
toward stocks, moving toward a more conservative mix as college nears. Every state’s 529 savings plan 
offers an age-based portfolio that follows this pattern. I use a portfolio mix typical of state 529s in 
calculating returns; this portfolio is shown in Table 3. I assume an identical portfolio mix for the other 
savings vehicles, so that any the variation in returns across the vehicles will be induced by variation in 
their treatment by the income tax and aid systems.  
Bonds are assumed to earn a nominal rate of four percent. Stocks are assumed to earn a nominal 
rate of nine percent, with two percent paid as dividends and the balance as long-term capital gains. 
Capital gains are realized when the funds are withdrawn from the account in order to pay for college; 
these withdrawals begin at the end of the eighteenth year.
16 After any relevant taxes on asset earnings are 
paid, earnings are reinvested.  
I calculate returns for the 529, ESA , a non-tax-advantaged mutual fund account in the name of 
the parent, a Uniform Transfer to Minors Act (UTMA) account in the name of the student, and a 
Traditional IRA.  Table 4 summarizes the income tax treatment of these savings vehicles. In about half 
the states, deposits to the 529 are excluded from state taxable income. I calculate returns for 529s both 
                                                      
15 The average is taken over the states that have an income tax. I use effective marginal state tax rates 
calculated by TAXSIM, rather than the bracket rates. The effective marginal rates account for the 
interaction of state and federal taxes as well as the phase-out of various credits and deductions. 
16 The family withdraws 1/nth of the remaining balance each year, with n representing the number of 
years remaining until college completion. For the calculations in the paper, I assume four years of college.   11
with and without this upfront deduction. Note that the  IRA can be used for higher education expenses 
without the 10 percent penalty usually assessed on withdrawals before retirement age.
17  
 
Calculation of Returns Net of Income Taxes for the Savings Vehicles 
I first calculate  the nominal returns for a family with household income of $50,000, using the 
assumptions laid out above. The return for a non-advantaged mutual fund account, held in the name of the 
parent, will form the benchmark used to gauge the financial benefits of the other, tax-advantaged vehicles.  
After paying Social Security and Medicare taxes (FICA), as well as federal and state income 
taxes, on $1,000 of pretax income, this household has $717 to deposit. The family uses the portfolio 
allocation shown in Table 3, putting 90 percent of the funds into stocks and the balance into bonds. 
Interest on the bonds is taxed as ordinary income; the interest net of taxes is reinvested in the account. 
After eighteen years, the account will have grown to $2,288, with 44 percent of the account’s value 
consisting of unrealized capital gains. At the end of year eighteen, one-quarter of the account balance is 
withdrawn to pay for college.  Capital gains taxes are paid on the 44 percent of this withdrawal that 
represents unrealized capital gains. After four years of withdrawals, the account is empty. Taking into 
account income and payroll taxes, as well as taxes on interest and capital gains, a family following the 
investment path just described nets $1,456 on its $1,000 in pretax saving, as shown in Figure 1.  
The tax-advantaged vehicles, including the 529 and ESA, increase returns by reducing or 
eliminating the taxes assessed before the initial deposit, during the inside buildup, and/or at withdrawal. 
The return for each of these vehicles is shown in Figure 1. Below, I briefly discuss the tax advantages 
conferred by each of these vehicles.  
The UTMA account shifts assets into the child’s name and, thereby, the child’s lower tax bracket.  
The initial pretax savings are taxed at the parent’s rate, and so $717 is deposited into the UTMA, as was 
                                                      
17 The earnings portion of such early withdrawals from a Roth IRA is subject to taxation as ordinary 
income. As a result, the Roth is not an advantageous vehicle for college savings if its use requires early 
withdrawal and I do not discuss the Roth further in this paper.   12
true for the parental account discussed above. Going forward, however, dividends, interest and capital 
gains are taxed at the child’s lower rate. For a family with household income of $50,000, these tax 
advantages translate into a slightly higher return on the UTMA than a parental account. This family yields 
$1,511 in a UTMA, just four percent more than in a parental account. This small advantage is explained 
by the fact that parents in this bracket face taxes only slightly higher than those levied on their children. 
A 529 savings account greater tax advantages than the UTMA, as the taxes on the inside buildup 
and withdrawals are not just reduced but eliminated. In a state that does not allow families to deduct 529 
deposits from taxable income, $1,000 of pretax income translates into the same $717 deposit that was 
placed in the parental account and UTMA. But because there are no taxes on the inside buildup, by the 
time the child enters college the family has a slightly higher balance in a 529 ($2,467) than they would in 
a parental account ($2,042) but less than they would in a UTMA ($2,870). The advantage of the 529 
grows as the family begins to draw down the funds and is exempted from any taxes on the resulting 
capital gains realizations. Accounting for these taxes, the family nets a $1,808 return on its $1,000 in 
pretax savings, 24 percent more than in a parental account and 20 percent more than a UTMA.  
The ESA confers the same tax advantages as the 529 without an upfront deduction and, therefore, 
yields the same return.
18  For the two vehicles, post-tax income is allowed to grow tax free, and 
withdrawals are untaxed. The IRA is the mirror image of these two instruments, in that there are no 
upfront taxes on the $1,000 deposit, no taxes on the inside buildup, but withdrawals are taxed as ordinary 
income. The IRA therefore yields the same return as the ESA and a 529 without a state deduction, 
producing a return 24 percent greater than a non-advantaged parental account. 
The option with the highest return is a 529 in a state that allows deposits to be deducted from 
state taxable income. For a given $1,000 in pretax income, more can be deposited into this account than is 
true for a non-deductible 529 or ESA: with the typical state tax rate on earned income of 6.43 percent, the 
initial deposit is $760, rather than $717. Going forward, the tax treatment is the same as for a standard 
                                                      
18 A key difference, however, is that much larger amounts can be deposited into a 529 than an ESA.    13
529 or ESA. The 529 with an upfront deduction yields a return of $1,976, 36 percent more than a non-
advantaged account in the parent’s name. 
As these calculations make clear, the education savings account provide new and substantial tax 
advantages. The 529 with the upfront reduction offers a higher return than any existing investment option. 
Further, the 529 and ESA, while yielding the same after-tax return as the IRA, substantially expand the 
assets that can be shielded from taxation. Finally, since the 529 has no eligibility requirements, it provides 
the first opportunity for tax-advantaged saving for those families ineligible for the IRA or ESA due to 
their high incomes or their access to a pension program at work.  
 
VARIATION IN THE BENEFIT OF THE ESA AND 529 ACROSS INCOME GROUPS 
The previous section calculated the financial return to the education savings accounts for a single tax 
bracket. However, the tax advantages vary with income. First, those facing high marginal tax rates benefit 
more from sheltering income from taxation than do those with low marginal tax rates. Second, the 
expected value of the education savings accounts depends on the probability that the child actually goes to 
college. Finally, returns for lower-to-middle-income families are affected by the way the financial aid 
system treats the tax-advantaged education savings accounts. In this section, I address each of these issues 
in turn. 
 
Variation in the Value of the Education Savings Accounts Due to Marginal Tax Rates 
In this section, I examine the advantages of the education savings accounts for a range of 
household incomes, ranging from the lowest federal tax bracket (household income of $35,000 or less) to 
the highest (household income of over $335,000). The groups and their associated state and federal tax 
rates on earned income, capital gains, and interest are shown in Table 2.  
I first show how returns vary by income in our benchmark, a non-advantaged account held in the 
name of the parent. In Figure 2, and Table 5, we see that the lowest-income household has the highest 
absolute returns. This is due to this group’s relatively low tax rates on two types of income. First, this   14
group’s lower marginal tax rates on earned income produce a larger deposit for a given $1,000 of pre-tax 
income: they start with $773 in principal, compared to $572 for the highest-income family. This 
difference in the upfront taxation of income accounts for most of the variation across income groups in 
net returns. Second, and of lesser import, the lowest-income household faces the lowest marginal tax rates 
on capital gains, dividends and interest.  Between these two factors, after-tax returns drop as income rises. 
The highest-income household earns an after-tax return of $693 on its pretax savings of $1,000, while the 
lowest-income household earns 2.5 times as much, or $1,706.  
By eliminating some forms of taxation, the tax-advantaged vehicles flatten this income gradient 
in after-tax returns. Figures 3 and 4 show the after-tax return on the ESA and 529 for each income group. 
Figure 3 scales the returns relative to the return in the non-advantaged account for that income group. 
Figure 4 shows the returns in dollar terms. Note that since the returns for the ESA, 529 without an upfront 
deduction, and the IRA are identical, I have collapsed them into one category.
19  
The largest increases in returns accrue to the highest income group, both in dollar terms (Figure 
4) and relative terms (Figure 3). For those in the top federal tax bracket, the 529 with an upfront 
deduction delivers a net return twice as high as that on a non-advantaged account. The 529 without an 
upfront deduction and the ESA net an after-tax return 79 percent higher than funds held in a non-
advantaged account, and 24 percent higher than funds held in a UTMA. For those in the lowest bracket, 
the proportional increases are much lower: the return on a 529 with an upfront deduction is 28 percent 
higher than that on a non-advantaged account. The corresponding figure is 19 percent for the ESA and 
529 with no upfront deduction. Note that the UTMA does not benefit this lowest-income household, since 
the child and parent are in the same low tax bracket.  
                                                      
19 It should be recalled, however, that the contribution limits are far higher on the 529 than the ESA or 
IRA, leading the 529 to be particularly advantageous to those who save above the ESA or IRA limits, or 
who participate in a retirement plan at work and are above the associated IRA income limits. Also, note 
that those married households with AGI above $220,000 do not qualify for the ESA but do qualify for the 
529.   15
These calculations make clear that both the relative and absolute advantages of the education 
savings accounts rise steeply with income. At the bottom of the income distribution, where marginal tax 
rates are the lowest, the new accounts offer after-tax returns 19 to 28 percent higher than that on a non-
advantaged account. For an initial pretax investment of $1,000, this translates into an additional return of 
$320 to $482. In the top tax bracket, the new accounts offer after-tax returns 79 to 101 percent higher than 
that on a non-advantaged account. For an initial pretax investment of $1,000, this translates into an 
additional return of $545 to $698. The income gradient of returns is much flatter for the 529 and ESA 
than for other accounts. While in a non-advantaged account the lowest-income family earns 2.5 as much 
as the highest-income family, the ratio for funds held in a 529 or ESA is about 1.6. 
 
Variation in the Value of the Education Savings Accounts Due to College-Going Propensities 
The previous sections have shown that the 529 and ESA can confer substantial financial 
advantages. However, the education savings accounts have a downside that distinguishes them from other 
investment options: their tax benefits are contingent on the funds being used for educational expenses. If 
funds are put into one of these accounts and the child does not go to college, the net return on assets are 
reduced. This section examines how this penalty affects the value of the education savings accounts 
relative to other savings options, and how the value of this penalty varies by income.  
I first describe the statutory limits on the use of funds in each savings vehicle.  In order to yield 
the after-tax returns discussed in the previous section, the 529 and ESA must be used only for educational 
expenses, with 529 use limited to postsecondary expenses. Expenses are quite broadly defined to include 
tuition, fees, books, other school supplies, and living expenses. Withdrawals not used for these “qualified 
educational expenses” lose tax advantages. For both the 529 and ESA, the earnings portion of a 
withdrawal that is not used for qualified expenses is taxed as ordinary income, plus a federal penalty that   16
consists of 10 percent of the account’s earnings.
20 ESA non-qualified withdrawals can only be made by 
the beneficiary and are taxed at the beneficiary’s rate.  
States use two approaches in dealing with non-qualified withdrawals. In some states, such as 
Utah, non-qualified distributions from a 529 can be directed to either the owner or beneficiary, with the 
taxes paid by whoever receives the funds.
21 This allows non-qualified distributions to be taxed at the 
child’s (presumably lower) rate. In other states, such as Illinois, the withdrawal must be taxed at the 
owner’s rate.
22 A review of the plan documents of a dozen large states shows an even split between these 
two approaches. As I will show below, the approach taken has a large impact on after-tax returns, 
especially for upper-income families.   
Funds held in a parental account, UTMA, or IRA can be used much more flexibly than those in a 
529 or ESA. The parental account can be used for any expense. UTMA withdrawals by the parent are 
limited to those that benefit the child, but this definition is quite broad. Funds can be withdrawn from the 
Traditional IRA before age 59½ without incurring a 10 percent penalty if they are used for postsecondary 
expenses, the purchase of a first home, disability, or excessive medical expenses.
23 
Relative to the non-advantaged account, UTMA and IRA, then, the ESA and 529 are more risky 
for families in which the college attendance of the children is uncertain. In order to quantify this risk, I 
first calculate the return to non-qualified use of the various college saving options. In these calculations, I 
                                                      
20 An exception is granted if the child attends college and receives a scholarship. In this case, actual costs 
plus the value of the scholarship are treated as qualified expenses. If a child chooses not to attend college, 
the parent can also change the beneficiary of the 529 or ESA to a relative. “Relative” includes previous 
generations (parents or ancestors of parents, siblings of parents), the current generation (spouse, siblings 
and their spouses, first cousins) and the next generation (children and their spouses, children of siblings).  
21 “All non-qualifying refunds will be taxed to the participant or beneficiary, depending on who receives 
the refund, and will be reported to the appropriate taxing authorities in the year they are made.” Accessed 
at the Utah Education Savings Plan website on March 14, 2004. See 
http://www.uesp.org/QUESTIONS___ANSWERS/questions___answers.html. 
22 “[T]he earnings portion of withdrawals or distributions from an Account other than Qualified 
Withdrawals…are includable in computing income of the Account Owner for federal income tax 
purposes…” See Bright Start College Savings Program (2004), p. 47.  
23 While one can make withdrawals from an IRA for college, one can’t do so from a 401(k), though one 
can take a loan from the 401(k) account.   17
assume that the family follows the same investment strategy as a family that sends the child to college, 
but rather than begin withdrawals at age 18 the funds are held until the child is age 22, at which point the 
family decides that the child is not going to college and empties the account.
24  Note that the returns 
change for all savings options, not just the 529 and ESA, when the accounts are not used for college. This 
is because holding the funds for 22 years rather than beginning withdrawals at year 18 produces more 
earnings in the last four years of the investment horizon. The returns to non-college use are shown in 
Table 5. 
Due to the penalty and income tax on non-qualified withdrawals, returns on the ESA drop 
substantially (Table 5). However, the impact of the penalty differs across income groups. Recall that 1) 
the earnings portion of withdrawals is taxed at the beneficiary’s rate and 2) the penalty is not assigned 
proportional to a household’s tax rate but is a fixed proportion (10 percent) of earnings. Relative to the 
large tax savings that high-income families gain by shifting income into their children’s tax bracket, the 
10 percent penalty is small. Relative to the small tax savings that low-income families gain by shifting 
income into their children’s tax bracket, the 10 percent penalty is large. As a result, the penalty for non-
qualified withdrawals makes the ESA a worse deal than other investment options for low-income 
families, but leaves it still relatively attractive for high-income families.
25   
In particular, the upper four brackets are still better off in an ESA than in a UTMA or non-
advantaged account, even once the penalty for non-qualified use is assessed. Returns are 11 to 24 percent 
higher than in a non-advantaged account [Figure 5]. By contrast, once a penalty for non-qualified use is 
assessed, those in the two lower brackets are worse off in the ESA than they would have been in a non-
advantaged account. For example, those in the lowest bracket earn 11 percent less than they would in a 
                                                      
24 The calculations also assume that the state in which the 529 is held does not attempt to recapture the 
value of any upfront deduction. At least one state, Illinois, has shown a willingness to recapture the 
deduction under some circumstances; that state penalizes families that have taken the Illinois deduction 
but subsequently moved funds to another state’s 529. 
25 Note that this observation applies to the penalty assessed for early withdrawal of funds from individual 
retirement accounts. There, too, a fixed penalty of 10 percent is applied, and this penalty will hit those in 
the lower brackets relatively harder than those in the upper brackets.   18
non-advantaged account, if the funds are not used for college. Most strikingly, those in the top tax bracket 
gain a larger advantage from non-qualified use of an ESA (24 percent above their return in a non-
advantaged account, see Figure 5) than those in the bottom bracket gain from qualified use (19 percent, 
see Figure 3).  
This discussion carries over to the 529, for those states that allow non-qualified payments from 
529 accounts to be made to the child. In these states, parents can shift income to their child’s lower tax 
bracket, with high-income families netting substantial gains even when the accounts are used for non-
educational purposes. This avenue is closed in states that require non-qualified 529 withdrawals to be 
claimed by the account owner, thereby forcing earnings to be taxed at the parent’s higher tax rate. A 
review of the plan documents of a dozen large state 529 programs found an even split between the two 
treatments of non-qualified withdrawals.  
Figure 6 shows the impact on returns of these two different approaches to taxing non-qualified 
529 withdrawals. Allowing withdrawals to be taxed at the child’s rate produces a patterns of relative 
returns that rise with income: when the funds are used for non-educational purposes, those in the lowest 
tax brackets are worse off in a 529 than they would be in a non-advantaged account while those in the 
upper brackets are better off. Forcing withdrawals to be taxed at the parent’s rate produces the opposite 
pattern. In this case, everyone using funds for non-educational purposes is worse off in a 529 than a non-
advantaged account, but the higher brackets are hardest hit. While the lowest tax bracket yields 89 percent 
of the return that it would in a non-advantaged account, the highest bracket yields just 67 percent.  
As these calculations make clear, this is a place where program design is quite important. The 
penalty was created out of a concern that some households might strategically shelter large sums in the 
education savings accounts, without any intent of using them for college. Given that families in the top 
brackets are more likely to have significant assets to shelter, it is sensible to create a penalty structure that 
discourages them from using the education saving accounts for unintended purposes. However, as the 
ESA penalty (and the 529 penalty in those states that assign non-qualified withdrawals to the child’s 
income) is structured, those in the upper brackets can still benefit substantially from the education savings   19
accounts even when they do not use them for their intended purposes. By contrast, those in the lower 
brackets, who generally have few assets to shelter and who are unlikely to engage in such strategic tax 
avoidance, always face a lower return if the accounts are not used for educational purposes. 
  
 Variation in the Value of the Education Savings Accounts Due to the Financial Aid Tax 
A final source of variation across income groups in the value of the education savings accounts is 
the treatment of household assets in the determination of need-based financial aid for college.
26 The intent 
of the need-based financial aid system is to give more aid to those with fewer resources. Both assets and 
asset earnings are considered resources by the need-based aid formula, so each dollar increase in assets 
and asset earnings leads to a proportional reduction in financial aid. In this sense, the aid system “taxes” 
assets and asset returns of families potentially eligible for need-based aid.
27 Key to the present analysis is 
that this aid tax varies across savings instruments.  
One might dismiss the aid tax as irrelevant by noting that the poor get aid but do not save, and the 
rich save but do not get aid. This common wisdom is wrong, as there is substantial overlap in the income 
distributions of those who save and those who get aid.  First, note the 50 percent of those households 
holding 529 and ESA accounts have incomes below $81,000. Second, tabulations of the 2000 National 
Postsecondary Aid Survey (NPSAS) indicate that a substantial proportion of families with incomes above 
$80,000, and even $100,000, receive need-based aid, in the form of both grants and loans. Many of these 
students are at expensive, four-year colleges, which provide their own need-based grants to students. 
What kind of family is affected by the aid tax? Given the historically-high level of tuition prices, 
relatively well-off families qualify for need-based aid, and so face this tax. This is particularly true if the 
                                                      
26 This section uses results from Dynarski (2003). See that paper for detailed calculations and more 
information on the financial aid system and its treatment of different savings vehicles. 
27 See Edlin (1993) and Feldstein (1995) for more discussion of the aid tax.   20
student attends a private college, or if a family has multiple students in college at the same time.
28 As this 
section will show, families all along the income distribution fall into this category.  
For two kinds of families, however, the aid tax is zero. The first type of family is extremely needy 
(as defined by the need-based aid system) and receiving the maximum aid allowed.
 29 As a result, a 
marginal decrease in this family’s assets will not increase their aid, nor will a marginal increase in their 
assets decrease their aid. Since there is no link between assets and aid for this family, their aid tax is zero. 
The second type of family is at the other end of the spectrum: this family is very well off (again, as 
defined by the need-based aid system) and receiving no aid. Again, marginal changes in assets will not 
affect this family’s aid eligibility.  Any family that is not at one of these two extremes of need is subject 
to the aid policies described in this paper.  
Low-income families are most likely to receive aid, and get the largest aid packages. Among 
students with family incomes below $40,000, 79 percent receive need-based aid, averaging $6,904.
30 
However, it is also clear that middle- and even upper-income families are quite likely to receive 
substantial amounts of aid. Of students from families with incomes of $40,000 to $70,000, 53 percent 
receive need-based aid in the form of grants, loans or work-study, with the aid of recipients averaging 
$5,988. Moving up the income distribution, 32 percent of students from families with incomes of $70,000 
to $100,000 receive need-based aid averaging $5,288. Even in the highest income group, 18 percent are 
receiving some form of need-based aid, averaging $4,844.  
The composition of this need-based aid varies considerably across the income groups. While 63 
percent of students from families with income below $40,000 receive a Pell Grant averaging $2,290, only 
eight percent of students from families with incomes of $40,000 to $70,000 receive a Pell, and no 
                                                      
28 A family that has multiple children in college at a given point in time will be eligible for more need-
based aid than if those children attended college in sequence. 
29 Total aid is capped by a student’s actual schooling costs, which includes tuition and fees plus an 
allowance for such items as food, rent and other living expenses. 
30 These data are for full-time, dependent, non-foreign undergraduates attending college in academic year 
1999-2000, and are taken from the 1999-2000 National Postsecondary Aid Survey (NPSAS).   21
students in higher income categories. While the Pell is heavily concentrated among low-income students, 
the story is quite different for other forms of need-based aid. Colleges and universities, especially the 
more-expensive private schools, distribute their own need-based scholarships. Among students with 
family income between $40,000 and $70,000, 25 percent receive need-based grants from their schools, 
with the grant of recipients averaging $4,034.  Even among families with incomes above $100,000, 11 
percent receive need-based grants from their schools averaging $4,591.
31  
Many middle-and upper-income students also qualify for the need-based Stafford Loan. While 
loans are obviously less valuable than grants, the need-based Stafford (also known as the subsidized 
Stafford) has very attractive terms. The subsidy value of a Stafford loan is currently about thirty cents on 
the dollar.
32 In the $40,000 to $70,000 income range, 23 percent of students receive a subsidized Stafford 
loan averaging $3,127. In the highest income category the figures are 9 percent and $3,227, respectively. 
Many of the families who receive need-based aid will be on the margin of getting more aid – that 
is, an increase (decrease) in their financial resources will decrease (increase) the amount of aid for which 
they are eligible. As noted earlier, this includes any family that is not getting the maximum aid allowable 
given their schooling costs. Such families are subject to the aid policies I describe in the paper.  
Briefly, the aid tax has two components: a tax on asset balances and a tax on asset earnings, with 
the magnitude of each tax depending on the type of asset. Table 6 lists the components of the aid tax for 
various savings vehicles. To illustrate how the aid tax works, let us consider a non-advantaged account 
                                                      
31 Most schools follow the federal formulas described in this paper in distributing their own need-based 
grant. Eighty-seven percent of four-year public schools and 57 percent of four-year private schools use 
the federal formula in distributing their own need-based grants (National Association of Student Financial 
Aid Administrators and the College Board (2002). 
32 See Dynarski (2002). The bulk of the subsidy arises from the government paying the interest on the 
loan while the student is in school. The subsidy value on the Stafford is at a historical low, since market 
interest rates are quite low.  As market interest rates rise, so too does the subsidy value. The subsidy value 
rises especially rapidly when market rates exceed the statutory rate cap of 8.25 percent, as above this rate 
the government assumes all interest rate risk.    22
held in the name of the parent. The annual tax on asset balances, in this case, is 5.64 percent.
33 If the child 
goes to college for just one year, this 5.64 percent is the (marginal) aid tax on asset balances for this 
family. However, for each year of college, the asset balance is again taxed at the 5.64 percent rate.
34  
Assuming a student attends college for four years, a given dollar in assets held for this entire period is 
taxed at a rate of  21 percent [=1-(1-0.0564)
4]. This is the aid tax rate on balances in accounts considered 
to be owned by the parent (excluding retirement accounts and home equity, whose balances are not 
taxed). Balances in accounts considered to be owned by the student are taxed at a rate of 35 percent, or 82 
percent over four years of college.  
Any earnings from the non-advantaged account are also taxed, if they arrive in a year whose 
income is considered in determining college aid.
35 The aid tax rate on asset earnings (net of any income 
taxes) is 47 percent for a non-advantaged account held by the parent. This tax is applied to both earnings 
accruals and to any earnings realized upon withdrawals from the account. Note that, in an account that has 
been building value for 18 years, a substantial portion of the balance will consist of unrealized earnings. 
In a non-advantaged account, given the investment scenario we have been assuming throughout the paper, 
unrealized earnings will represent about 44 percent of account value. As the account is drawn down for 
college, earnings will be realized and after-income-tax realizations assessed by the aid formula.  
Table 7 and Figure 7 show the impact of the aid tax on after-tax returns for various savings 
vehicles. In the first column is the return on a given savings vehicle for a household that is unaffected by 
                                                      
33 This tax rate is a function of the family’s overall financial position, as summarized by the family’s 
“adjusted available income” (AAI). AAI is a weighted sum of income and assets, net of allowable 
expenses, including taxes. The AAI tax is progressive and steep, with little distance between the lowest 
and highest tax rate. The lowest rate applies to an AAI of $11,000, while the schedule tops out at an AAI 
of $24,000. In the calculation of aid taxes, I assume that families are at the top of this schedule. 
34 For each year of college, the child must reapply for aid, providing a newly-competed set of aid and 
income tax forms. 
35 Tax returns from the previous year are used to report income for the purposes of determining financial 
aid determination, so income is considered with a lag. For a child who attends college for four years, asset 
income received in the senior year of high school and first three years of college will be subject to the aid 
tax.   23
the aid tax; these are the returns we have seen in earlier tables. In the second column of Table 7 are 
returns net of the aid tax. I assume, as I have throughout the paper, that funds are drawn down over the 
four years of college. These results are not shown for the top two tax brackets, in which I assume 
household income is sufficiently high (above $196,400) that the child is beyond the margin of eligibility 
of need-based financial aid at even the most expensive institutions. Columns (3) and (4) express the aid 
tax as a percent of the asset balance at the start of college and as a percent of the after-income-tax return, 
respectively. 
As Figure 7 makes clear, the college savings vehicles provide higher net returns than any other 
investment option for those who are on the aid margin.  If an aid-marginal child applies to college with 
funds in an ESA or 529, over the course of her college career she will lose about fifteen cents in aid for 
each dollar she holds in her education savings account. By contrast, if the money was held in her parents 
IRA, she would lose 26 to 33 cents for each dollar of assets and if it was held in a non-advantaged 
account belonging to her parents she would lose 40 to 45 cents.  
Most dramatically, each dollar held in a UTMA would reduce aid by over a dollar over the course 
of a college career. That is, for the UTMA, returns net of the aid tax are negative. When we consider only 
income taxes, an aid-marginal family with household income of $50,000 that puts $1,000 pretax dollars in 
a UTMA nets a return of $1,511. This return is four percent higher than if the funds were invested in a 
non-advantaged account. But once we consider the aid tax, this small financial advantage disappears. The 
final return on the $1,000 pretax investment, net of income and aid taxes, is -$1,360. This family loses all 
principal and all earnings, plus an additional $360, to the aid and income taxes.  
Until early 2004, the ESA was treated the same as the UTMA in the calculation of financial aid. 
As shown in Dynarski (forthcoming), this resulted in negative returns on the ESA for aid-marginal 
families, with all principal and earnings lost to income and aid taxes. The US Department of Education 
released new rules that alter the treatment of the ESA, bringing it in line with that of the 529 savings 
plans. While the ESA was once considered an asset of the child, it is now considered an asset of the 
parent, like the 529. Further, the earnings portion of ESA withdrawals no longer counts as income for the   24
purposes of calculating financial aid. As a result of these provisions, the 529 savings plans and ESA now 
receive the most favorable treatment by the aid system of all the investment options we have considered. 
The IRA, the next best option, fares relatively poorly because after-tax withdrawals from the IRA 
are counted as income in the aid formula. For example, a family with $50,000 in income nets an after-tax 
return of $1,808 in an IRA, the same as the return in an ESA or a 529 without an upfront deduction. Once 
the aid tax is considered, however, the return on the IRA drops to $844 while that on the education 
savings accounts drops only to $1,441. A non-advantaged account fares even worse, because unlike the 
IRA the asset balance, as well as withdrawals, is considered in the calculation of aid. For our aid-marginal 
family with $50,000 of income, a non-advantaged account yields just $449 after income and aid taxes. 
There are two conclusions to draw from these figures. First, the aid tax reduces asset returns, 
including those in the college savings accounts, for those on the margin of getting more or less financial 
aid. Because low- to middle-income families are more likely to be on the aid margin than high-income 
families, the aid tax therefore contributes to the concentration of the benefits of the 529 and ESA among 
those in the highest tax brackets. Second, the 529 and ESA now provide greater shelter from the aid tax 
than any other financial instrument.
36 For aid-marginal families in the middle two brackets, the ESA and 
529 more than undo the aid tax. A family with $100,000 in income that is subject to the aid tax nets about 
20 percent more in an ESA than it would if it did not face the aid tax and held its funds in a non-
advantaged account. By contrast, for those aid-marginal families in the bottom two tax brackets, the ESA 
(and 529 without a deduction) comes just shy of undoing the aid tax. The return on the ESA for an aid-
marginal family with income of $50,000 is just below the return of a non-advantaged account with an aid 
tax of zero [$1,441 and $1,456, respectively; see Table 8]. 
 
                                                      
36 Home equity is fully sheltered from the aid tax.   25
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The discussion so far has focused on differences in the net returns to the education savings 
accounts and alternative savings vehicles. Before summarizing those differences and closing the paper, I 
would like to touch on some other key differences between these various investment options. The first 
difference is that of the degree of control that parents have over the funds. Parents may wish to control 
how savings are spent, and for them this preference may trump tax advantages. For example, if funds in a 
UTMA are not spent on college, they still go the child eventually; the parent cannot take back UTMA 
funds. The same holds for the ESA: the funds cannot be taken back.
37 When an ESA beneficiary reaches 
age 30, the funds are automatically released to the beneficiary as a non-qualified withdrawal. These 
limitations in the degree of parental control may make the ESA and UTMA unattractive to some parents, 
even if they offer the highest return of the available options. 
A parent can hold more control over their children’s use of funds by using a 529. A 529 account 
owner can change the beneficiary, as is true with the ESA, but can also liquidate the account and pocket 
the funds, albeit after paying taxes and a penalty. A non-tax-advantaged account held in the parent’s name 
offers no shelter from income and aid taxes, but it gives the account owner the most control over when 
and for whom to disburse the funds. 
A related difference between the various savings vehicles is their option value. Funds held in a 
non-advantaged account can be used for any purpose, with no penalty, should a child choose not to attend 
college. Similarly, funds can be left in an IRA, with the tax deferral on earnings continuing until 
retirement. By contrast, the 529 and ESA have relatively limited option value, since they can be used for 
non-educational purposes only after paying a penalty.  
Behavioral economics may also shed light on how parents choose a savings vehicle. From the 
behavioral standpoint, the penalty for non-qualified use may be perceived as a benefit rather than a 
drawback, as it helps to commit parents to hold funds for college rather than use them for current 
                                                      
37 The account owner can, however, select a new beneficiary who is a relative of the previous beneficiary 
and under 30 years old.   26
consumption or to pay off debt. In this way, the ESA and 529 resemble the IRA and 401(k), which 
commit workers to save for retirement or face a penalty for early withdrawal of funds. Also in order to 
commit themselves to a certain spending pattern, parents may also like to have separate savings accounts 
for different purposes, such as retirement and education, even if this comes at some cost.
38 This is the 
mirror image of the fungibility discussion in the previous paragraphs. A non-advantaged account offers 
the most freedom for the account owner, but this very freedom will be seen as a drawback by parents 
whose saving behavior is characterized by mental accounting. 
I have found that the advantages of the 529 and ESA rise sharply with income, for three reasons. 
First, those with the highest marginal tax rates benefit the most from sheltering income, gaining most in 
both absolute and relative terms. This distributional impact of the 529 and ESA is the same as that on all 
tax-advantaged savings vehicles, including the IRA and 401(k).  
The second reason that the advantages of the ESA and 529 rise with income is more subtle and is 
driven by the fact that the 529 and ESA are education saving incentives. Both vehicles reward those who 
save and use their savings for postsecondary education. Both vehicles include provisions that punish those 
who do not use the funds for education. There is therefore some risk associated with using these accounts, 
as net returns are substantially reduced if the beneficiary does not use the funds for schooling.  The 
treatment of non-qualified withdrawals from the ESA, and from the 529s of some states, further tilts the 
benefits of these accounts toward upper-bracket families. Non-qualified withdrawals from the ESA are 
assigned to the beneficiary for tax purposes, and so face the child’s lower tax rate. As a result, those in the 
top tax brackets gain a larger advantage from non-qualified use of an ESA than those in the bottom 
bracket gain from qualified use.  
Given that the penalty was created out of a concern that some households might strategically 
shelter large sums in the education savings accounts, without any intent of using them for college, the 
choice of penalty structure is important. Families in the top brackets, who are more likely to have 
                                                      
38 Thaler (1999) provides a discussion of mental accounting and its impact on individuals’ financial 
decisions.   27
significant assets to shelter, can still benefit substantially from the ESA and, in some states the 529, even 
when they do not use them for their intended purposes. By contrast, those in the lower brackets, who 
generally have few assets to shelter and who are unlikely to engage in such strategic tax avoidance, 
consistently face a lower return if the accounts are not used for educational purposes. Requiring that the 
earnings portion of non-qualified withdrawals from the ESA and 529 be taxed at the parents’ tax rate 
would help to undo this perverse incentive structure. An additional option is to assess a penalty 
proportional to the account owner’s tax rate, rather than the current flat penalty of 10 percent of earnings. 
Finally, the college financial aid system taxes away the advantages of the 529 and ESA for those 
low- and middle-income families that are on the margin of receiving aid. While the income tax system 
disproportionately penalizes low-income 529 and ESA beneficiaries who do not go to college, the aid 
system reduces returns on the 529 and ESA for those who do go to college. The need-based financial aid 
system reduces aid when a family holds assets, including those in the college savings accounts, for those 
on the margin of getting more or less financial aid. Because low- to middle-income families are more 
likely to be on the aid margin than high-income families, the aid tax therefore contributes to the 
concentration of the benefits of the 529 and ESA among those in the highest tax brackets.  While the aid 
tax does reduce returns on all financial assets for those in the lower tax brackets, the 529 and ESA do 
provide greater shelter from the aid tax than any other financial instrument.  
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 All Households 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Has 529 or ESA 3% 100% 5% - -
Has IRA or Keogh 38% 70% 100% - -
Median Income 50,000 91,000 75,000 16,000 41,000
 
Median Net Worth 61,830 281,200 227,600 53,600 219,370
Mean Balance in IRA accounts 20,132 89,400  56,523 32,877  69,268
(108,599) (276,948) (174,129)  (28,073)   (17,480) 
Mean Balance in 529 Accounts 126 4,664 148 4,516  4,538
(2,239) (12,951) (3,045) (694) (465)
Age of Oldest Parent 38.78 40.98 41 -0.02 2.2
(8.50) (6.59) (8.05)  (1.22)   (1.26) 
Age of Oldest Child 10.71 9.42 10.46 -1.04 -1.29
(5.88) (5.23) (5.74)  (0.87)   (0.88) 
Number of Children 2.08 1.99 2.07 -0.08 -0.09
(1.05) (0.86) (0.99)  (0.15)   (0.16) 
Highest Education of Parents 13.89 16.19 14.91 1.28  2.30
(2.49) (1.18) (2.30)  (0.34)   (0.37) 
Parent BA or Higher 0.37 0.91 0.59 0.32  0.54
(0.48) (0.29) (0.49)  (0.07)   (0.07) 
N 1533 46 588 - -
Table 1
Characteristics of Education Savings Account Investor
Households with Children
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances
Ntoes: Standard deviations in parentheses in first three columns. Standard errors in parentheses in last two columns. 
Imputation Two of SCF; weights used.Federal State FICA Federal State Federal State Federal State
$35,000 10% 5.08% 7.65% 5% 4.41% 10% 5.08% 5% 5.08%
$50,000 15% 5.65% 7.65% 5% 4.83% 15% 5.65% 5% 5.65%
$100,000 25% 6.29% 1.45% 15% 5.22% 25% 6.29% 15% 6.29%
$150,000 28% 6.43% 1.45% 15% 5.61% 28% 6.43% 15% 6.43%
$200,000 33% 6.38% 1.45% 15% 5.48% 33% 6.38% 15% 6.38%
$335,000+ 35% 6.40% 1.45% 15% 5.56% 35% 6.40% 15% 6.40%
Dividends
Table 2
Marginal Tax Rates Used in Calculations
Household 
Income
Earned Income Capital Gains Interest Income
Notes: Federal rates are 2003 bracket rates. State rates are average of effective 2002 marginal rates calculated from NBER TAXSIM. State averages taken 
across states that have an income tax.Year: 1-3 4-6 7-8 9 10 11-12 13 14-15 16-22
Capital Gains 7%
Dividends 2%
Bond Share 10% 15% 26% 32% 41% 42% 55% 58% 75% Bonds 4%
Table 3
Nominal Rate of Return
Stock Share 90% 85% 74% 68% 59% 58% 45% 42% 25%
Age-Based Portfolio Used in Return Calculations
Note: Values reflect typical age-based 529 portfolio. Investment Option
Income Limit 
married, filing jointly
Taxes Paid on Income,
  pre-deposit
Taxed Paid on Inside Build-up Taxes Paid at Withdrawal
529 Federal and state, FICA.
529 with deduction Federal and FICA.
Coverdell ESA $220,000  Federal and state, FICA
UTMA Federal and state, FICA
Federal and state.
First $750 untaxed
Child 14+: earnings >$750 at child's rate
Child <14: next $750 at child's rate & 
>$1500 at parent's rate
Federal and state on realized 
capital gains, child's rate
Non-Advantaged 
Account, Parent
Federal and state, plus FICA Federal and state




No income limit if no work-
related retirement plan.
FICA
Federal and state on entire 
withdrawal
Table 4
Tax Treatment of College Saving Alternatives





























Withdrawals Taxed at 
Parents' Tax Rate
Withdrawals Taxed at 
Child's Tax Rate
529 (Deduction)
$35K $2,188 $1,825 $1,825
$50K $1,976 $1,511 $1,637
$100K $1,811 $1,143 $1,491
$150K $1,683 $981 $1,378
$200K $1,475 $734 $1,193
$335K+ $1,391 $638 $1,119
529 (No Deduction)
$35K $2,026 $1,682 $1,682
$50K $1,808 $1,369 $1,488
$100K $1,634 $1,008 $1,334
$150K $1,511 $854 $1,225
$200K $1,317 $623 $1,053
$335K+ $1,238 $533 $983
Table 5
After-Tax Return to College Savings Options
Note: In the case of college attendance, funds are drawn down starting in year 18 of the 
investment horizon. Otherwise, funds are withdrawn in year 22.
Non-College UseInvestment Option
Annual Assessment on 
Asset Balance
Annual Assessment on 
Earnings Net of Income Tax
Assessment of Withdrawals
Non-Advantaged Account, Parent 5.64% 47% 47% of realized earnings net of income tax
Traditional IRA 0% 0% 47% of withdrawal net of income tax
529 5.64% 0% None
Coverdell 5.64% 0% None
UTMA 35% 50% 50% of realized earnings net of income tax
Table 6
Aid System's Treatment of Saving Alternatives in Aid Determination
Note: In early 2004, the US Department of Education altered the treatment of the Coverdell in the determination of aid eligibility. This chart, and the 
paper's calculations, reflect this new treatment.After-Tax 
Return
After-Tax Return, 
Net of Aid Loss
Aid Loss As % of 
Asset Balance at 
Start of College
Aid Loss As % of 
After-Tax Return
529 (Deduction)
$35K $2,188 $1,772 15% 19%
$50K $1,976 $1,587 15% 20%
$100K $1,811 $1,444 15% 20%
$150K $1,683 $1,333 15% 21%
$200K $1,475 - - -
$335K+ $1,391 - - -
529 (No Deduction)
$35K $2,026 $1,631 15% 19%
$50K $1,808 $1,441 15% 20%
$100K $1,634 $1,290 15% 21%
$150K $1,511 $1,183 15% 22%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
ESA
$35K $2,026 $1,631 15% 19%
$50K $1,808 $1,441 15% 20%
$100K $1,634 $1,290 15% 21%
$150K $1,511 $1,183 15% 22%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
UTMA
$35K $1,706 -$1,388 124% 181%
$50K $1,511 -$1,360 124% 190%
$100K $1,355 -$1,337 124% 199%
$150K $1,245 -$1,219 119% 198%
$200K $1,072 - - -
$335K+ $1,001 - - -
Traditional IRA
$35K $2,026 $987 33% 51%
$50K $1,808 $844 31% 53%
$100K $1,634 $730 27% 55%
$150K $1,511 $649 26% 57%
$200K $1,317 - - -
$335K+ $1,238 - - -
Table 7
After-Tax Return to College Savings Alternatives, Net of Financial Aid Losses
Notes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 2. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax 
earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the final four years of the investment horizon.Notes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over 
the final four years of the investment horizon.
Figure 1: After-Tax Return to College Savings Options














529 (Deduction) 529 (No Deduction) ESA Traditional IRA UTMANotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the 
final four years of the investment horizon.
Figure 2:  
After-Tax Return to Non-Advantaged Account Held in Name of Parent











$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household  IncomeNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over 
the final four years of the investment horizon.
Figure 3: 
After-Tax Return to College Saving Options 






$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household Income
529 (Deduction)
529 (No Deduction), ESA or Traditional IRA
UTMA
Non-Advantaged Account, ParentNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over 
the final four years of the investment horizon.
Figure 4 







$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household Income
529 (Deduction)
529 (No Deduction), ESA or Traditional IRA
UTMA
Non-Advantaged Account, ParentNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds withdrawn in year 
22 of the investment horizon.
Figure 5
After-Tax Returns, Non-College Use






$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household Income
ESA
Non-Advantaged Account, ParentNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds withdrawn in year 
22 of the investment horizon.
Figure 6 
After-Tax Return to 529 (No Upfront Deduction), Non-College Use






$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household Income
Withdrawals Taxed at Child's Rate
Withdrawals Taxed at Parents' RateNotes: Assumes portfolio mix of Table 3. One-time investment of $1,000 at birth of child with all after-tax earnings reinvested. Funds drawn down over the 
final four years of the investment horizon.
Figure 7
Return to College Saving Options, Net of Aid Lost and Income Tax









$35K $50K  $100K  $150K  $200K  $335K+ 
Household Income
529 (Deduction)
529 (No Deduction) and ESA
Traditional IRA
UTMA
Non-Advantaged Account